Abstract. This paper formulates a medium-term macroeconomic model of disposable income, unemployment, inflation and state spending, proposes a theory of qualitative choice to explain electoral popularity in terms of these variables and develops three approaches to the formulation of political-economic policy. The first approach is static, sets the tax rate to reconcile the interests of various pressure groups and yields a political trade-off between the private and public sector. The second approach relies on maximizing the probability of winning the next election and gives rise to a political business cycle unless the electorate votes strategically. The implications of crowding out of private investment under alternative monetary rules, autonomous behaviour of the state bureaucracy and tax-indexation for the political business cycle are also examined. The third approach analyzes the objective of maximizing the uninterrupted length in office. It yields a shortrun political cycle superimposed on a longer cycle.
Introduction
The theory of economic policy views the government as a benevolent dictator who implements policy in an attempt to promote social welfare. It is concerned with how a government ought to behave, so that it has a normative character. It ignores the fact that a government has objectives of its own, manifested in its ideology and its attempts to secure re-election, which may well differ from the social welfare objective. Positive theories of how a government actually behaves are needed and provided by political economics (e.g., Kalecki, 1943; Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976; Frey, 1978b) . They are the subject of this paper.
Existing theories of political economics (see surveys in Frey, 1978a; and 1978b) suffer from at least three problems. Firstly, most studies relate popularity to economic performance in an ad-hoc manner and therefore lack a satisfactory theory of voting behaviour. Secondly, the public sector is usually not separated into the component which does not depend on the electorate for survival, e.g., the state bureaucracy and the monetary authorities, and the part which does depend on re-election for its survival, the government. In practice there may be conflict between these components of the public sector, which so far has been ignored. Thirdly, previous studies of the optimal political business cycle (e.g., Nordhaus, 1975; Frey and Ramser, 1976; MacRae, 1977) focus on the political trade-off between inflation and unemployment and ignore the effects of real personal disposable income and state spending on electoral popularity. Furthermore, these studies do not discuss the policy instrumentarium necessary to attain the optimal unemployment trajectory.
This paper attempts to remedy the above deficiencies by postulating a complete macroeconomic model of the economy (goods, money and labour markets) and the bureaucracy (Section 2), proposing a theory of qualitative choice to explain electoral popularity (Section 3), discussing optimal approaches to the formulation of political-economic strategies for the government and examining the implications of such strategies within the context of a closed politicaleconomic system (Sections 4-8).
The economy without political feedbacks
Instantaneous equilibrium of the goods and the money markets are described by the IS-and LM-curve, respectively. The IS-curve is given by 1 Q = C(Q -rQ) + I(r -pe) + G, 0 < C 1 < 1, 11 < 0
( 1) where Q, C, I, G, r, r and pe denote respectively real output, personal consumption, private investment, government consumption, the direct tax rate, the nominal interest rate and the expected rate of inflation. For simplicity it is assumed that there is only direct taxation, all interest payments to the personal sector are saved, wealth effects are not present in the consumption function and the stock of capital is fixed in the short run. Investment simply depends on the expected real rate of return on the alternative asset, (r -pC). The assumption relating to investment are not too unrealistic, since this paper focuses on the length of an election period and therefore concentrates on rather short-term effects. The money market is described by the LM-curve, which is given by
where M, L and P denote respectively the supply of money, the demand for cash balances in real terms and the price level. The agents in the economy demand money to finance transactions, captured by Q, to finance speculation activities, explained by the return on bonds, (r -pC), in relation to the return on cash, -pC, and hold money for precautionary purposes. The effects of wealth on the demand for money are ignored.
